CJCS Guide 3401 B

CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System

1 Sept 2000

Although the United States currently enjoys relative peace and security, the international security environment remains complex and dangerous. Recent history confirms that our military must be ready to respond to crises that threaten US interests--anywhere on the globe. Successful execution of this National Military Strategy requires a modern, fully manned, well-equipped, and trained military force. But monitoring the traditional readiness indicators of "people, equipment, and training" is just one part of the total readiness equation. We must also ensure that the combatant commanders are provided with the warfighting capabilities they require to execute assigned missions.

The Chairman's Readiness System is designed to measure the ability of the military to fulfill the most demanding requirements of the National Military Strategy. We will continue to refine the assessment process to ensure the leadership at all levels is aware of our readiness to fight and win. This system allows us to replace anecdotal reports with rigorous, fact-based evaluations that effectively portray specific problems in areas like equipment availability, aviation mission-capable rates, recruiting and retention, and aging infrastructure.

The Joint Staff and the Services continue to work together to improve the readiness reporting systems. Objectives remain to ensure accurate reporting, to focus on key warfighting deficiencies, and reinforce the link to budgetary and operational solutions. Inputs from the CINCs and Services have helped us better understanding the specific shortfalls that underlie overall risk assessments, particularly for major theater war scenarios.

This guide is designed to familiarize you with the policies and procedures the Armed Forces of the United States use to assess and report current readiness. It serves as a cornerstone for our military's preparation and ability to execute the National Military Strategy.

General HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Ready, Willing, and Able

Introduction

Today's international security environment is particularly volatile, presenting a broad range of threats to US interests across the spectrum of conflict.

To this end, it is critical that we continually assess our current warfighting readiness and capabilities. The Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) provides a common framework for conducting commanders' readiness assessments. It blends unit-level Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) indicators with CINC and Combat Support Agency (CSA) subjective assessments of their ability to execute the National Military Strategy.

> **"**Even as we focus on the present, we must look to the future to ensure that tomorrow's force is just as ready, just as capable, and just as versatile as today's. Given finite resources, maintaining current readiness and funding modernization for the future will often conflict – but both are equally important. To ensure that tomorrow's Joint Force remains the world's best, we are moving forward to "operationalize" Joint Vision 2010 – our conceptual framework for future joint operations – on a number of fronts."
>
> **-- General Henry H. Shelton,**
> **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,**
> **Posture Statement before Congress,**
> **11 May 1999**

We will be frequently faced with the challenge of selectively using the unique capabilities of our Armed Forces to shape this international environment to advance national interests in peacetime while maintaining our readiness to respond to a crisis anywhere on the globe. We must remember that the fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win our Nation's wars.

Specifically, the CRS provides the Services, CINCs, and CSAs a readiness reporting system that measures their ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support units into effective joint forces ready to accomplish assigned missions.

The CRS has four major components.

- The Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) provides an ongoing assessment of our readiness to execute the National Military Strategy through a current, comprehensive assessment of unit and joint readiness at all three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic.

- The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) provides an assessment of future capabilities that will be critical to tomorrow's readiness. JWCA assessments also provide a vehicle for addressing readiness deficiencies that require programmatic action.

- Other established programs, such as the Chairman's Exercise Program, provide important readiness feedback.

- Frequent communication with the CINCs, Service Chiefs, and Directors of the CSAs provide additional information that the Chairman uses to make an overall assessment on the readiness of the force.

History has taught us that the Armed Forces must remain ready to answer the Nation's call. Today, the readiness of the force is the Department of Defense's (DOD) top priority. The results of the quarterly JMRR process are briefed to senior OSD officials, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, at the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). These SROC presentations give OSD leadership increased visibility into the current readiness of the force and provide a forum to address near-term readiness concerns.

The DOD Authorization Act, 1996, requires the Secretary of Defense to forward a Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) based on readiness assessments provided to the SROC. The QRRC includes key indicators related to problems or deficiencies and planned remedial actions.

This Joint Guide serves as a source of information on readiness programs, assessments, and procedures. It is not intended to replace current regulations, orders, or approved instructions. It is published to provide information on how we define, measure, and maintain the readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Chapter One

Defining Readiness

We must understand what constitutes readiness of an effective fighting force to ensure we are prepared to respond.

Readiness is a fundamental characteristic of an effective armed force. One of the major challenges in ensuring a force is ready is understanding what readiness really means. Because of its conceptual nature, almost everyone has a different perception of what constitutes readiness. The effort to define readiness is not just an academic endeavor -- the 20th Century holds numerous examples of the cost our Nation has paid when its Armed Forces were not prepared to respond.

Lessons of History

We were not prepared to participate immediately in World War II.

World War II. The United States last had the luxury of advanced warning of pending involvement in conflict prior to World War II. Although military leaders started preparing for war in the late 1930s, the reduced readiness of the force precluded large-scale operations until late 1942. We learned even with warning it takes time to build a ready force.

Chapter One

We were unprepared for Korea after drastic post-World War II defense cuts -- which left us unable to respond adequately to the attack and increased our casualties.

Korea. The surprise attack of the North Korean forces offered no time to "get ready." Cuts in defense at the end of World War II left the military fragile, demoralized, and unable to respond to the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. The Army was particularly decimated by the cuts in defense -- shrinking from over 11 million soldiers at the end of World War II to just 592,000 in June 1950. America's failure to maintain readiness was apparent during the initial attempt to stop the invasion with ground forces -- Task Force Smith.

Task Force Smith was a battalion-size force of 540 men, composed of two understrength infantry companies and a light howitzer battery. Few of the officers or noncommissioned officers had seen action in World War II and had not received adequate training. The task force sorely lacked antiarmor capability.

On July 5, 1950, near Osan, Korea, south of Seoul, the task force was employed to halt a North Korean drive south. The North Korean force was greater than 1000 soldiers. It included 33 tanks. Task Force Smith was decimated by the North Korean onslaught, losing 150 men and all of its equipment in just 7 hours of fighting. Because of the lack of people, training, and equipment -- the key elements of readiness -- US forces suffered over 19,000 casualties before the Pusan perimeter was stabilized.

After Vietnam, the American military again went through drastic downsizing, creating the "hollow force" of the late 1970s.

Post-Vietnam. After withdrawing from Vietnam, the American military went through an abrupt downsizing similar to that experienced at the end of World War II. In 1980, General Edward C. Meyer, then Army Chief of Staff, used the term "hollow Army" in congressional testimony to describe the imbalance that existed between the number of Army divisions and the combat personnel available to fill those divisions. Soon after his testimony, the term "hollow force" became widely used to characterize not only the shortages of experienced personnel, but also shortages of training, weapons, and equipment. These conditions undermined military readiness during the mid- and late 1970s.

The Defense Science Board Readiness Task Force, created in 1993 by then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and chaired by General (Retired) Meyer, in its report dated June 1994, characterized the military of the late 1970s and early 1980s as "hollow forces," and the Service members during that period as "...on average less well educated, more involved with drugs, less well trained, less well equipped, less well sustained, less strategically mobile, and less highly regarded by the American public."

The "hollow" American military of that period was not prepared to respond to most major contingencies without considerable warning. America relied on well-maintained nuclear forces for deterrence, while conventional forces languished with personnel shortages and diversions, aging equipment, and constricted training and maintenance budgets.

The American military executed Operation "URGENT FURY" in Grenada successfully, but flaws in the campaign demonstrated that we still needed to learn to operate "jointly."

Grenada. Operation URGENT FURY began shortly before dawn on October 25, 1983, 12 days after the prime minister was overthrown and later killed by leftist military officers supported by Cuba. We committed over 8,500 members of the US Armed Forces to the operation, which was planned and successfully executed in the course of only days. However, numerous interoperability problems with the joint operation were later cited: Army helicopters could not communicate with naval support ships; the Services conducted separate, uncoordinated tactical operations instead of mounting a more effective joint effort; liaison procedures were nonexistent, or untried where they were present. Although the operation was termed a success after 3 days of sometimes heavy fighting, Grenada highlighted abundant issues confounding our ability to operate as a "joint force."

In the years since URGENT FURY, the US Armed Forces have made monumental strides in improving our abilities to operate "jointly." From DESERT STORM to ALLIED FORCE, from humanitarian and relief missions such as PROVIDE PROMISE to hurricane relief in Central America, each successive operation has shown improvements in our joint operations abilities. Each has further highlighted a need for a system to measure, assess, and report readiness from a joint perspective.

Chapter One

Traditional Readiness

The concept of readiness has evolved from a narrowly defined definition of "unit" readiness.

Through the early 1990s, readiness was narrowly defined as the capability of a unit to accomplish the missions for which it was designed. Readiness was Service oriented, without regard to a requirement to operate as part of a joint or multinational force.

GSORTS plays a critical role in readiness assessments.

Until the establishment of the Chairman's Readiness System in 1994, the only non-Service specific system we had to measure readiness was the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). GSORTS is the single, automated reporting system that functions as the central registry of all operational units in the US Armed Forces. In addition to serving as a registry, GSORTS also contains unit readiness metrics on select operational units. The Joint Staff, the Services, and the combatant commands use this readiness information in different ways.

GSORTS provides a current snapshot of select unit readiness information.

Though some consider GSORTS the comprehensive readiness system, GSORTS only addresses **unit** level readiness. What GSORTS does provide is a current snapshot of a select slice of unit information in four critical resource areas: personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment serviceability, and training. In addition, GSORTS provides the commander an opportunity to subjectively assess a unit's ability to undertake its wartime mission(s).

A commander's assessment includes many tangible and intangible factors.

As part of the subjective assessment, unit commanders evaluate such factors as personnel and operating tempo, quality of life issues, impact of funding and policy decisions, impending equipment changes and modernization, and participation in training exercises.

Readiness is more than GSORTS.

Commanders use GSORTS to report unit readiness. Although senior leaders use GSORTS data in the decision making process, they understand the data is not all-encompassing -- other factors weigh into the readiness equation. It is also important to understand that GSORTS is not a predictive system -- it cannot project future readiness.

Defining Readiness

Readiness must account for the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

To define readiness, one must answer the question "Ready to do what?" Warfighting can be described at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level of war is the level at which the Nation determines national security objectives. The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained. The tactical level of war is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. The traditional way of looking at readiness through GSORTS focused only on this tactical level of war -- there was no readiness system that encompassed all three levels.

Chapter One

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for the readiness of the force to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy.

Because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy -- war at the strategic level -- a new system was needed. Readiness at the Joint level is defined as the synthesis of readiness at the operational and tatical levels. In addition, strategic readiness must focus on broad functional areas such as intelligence and mobility that meet worldwide demands.

The operational level of readiness focuses the CINCs' ability to integrate and synchronize forces.

Readiness at the operational level must consider the joint perspective. Joint readiness is defined as the CINC's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute the assigned missions.

The UJTL provides a common language to describe mission requirements.

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) offers one framework for readiness assessments and describes the Armed Forces' ability to perform activities required to execute their assigned missions.

Tactical level readiness is measured through the units of the Services.

Readiness at the tactical level is primarily measured through the units of the four Services. Unit readiness is defined as the ability to undertake the mission for which the unit was designed.

Readiness: "The Chairman's Perspective"



The definition of readiness allows us to delineate responsibilities to maintain readiness.

These definitions are key because they delineate the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the CINCs in maintaining readiness. The CSAs must also use these definitions to assess their readiness and responsiveness to perform with respect to their ability to support the CINCs and Services. They are the foundation of the Chairman's Readiness System. The focus is on near-term operational issues.

Once definitions and responsibilities are specified, we can start to build a system to "measure" readiness, and then apply resources against readiness deficiencies that may arise.

Chapter Two

How We Assess Readiness

Building the Chairman's Readiness System

The Chairman's Readiness System was implemented to provide the information necessary to fulfill his requirements to keep the Secretary of Defense and Congress informed of force capabilities and deficiencies.

The Chairman's Readiness System was implemented in the fall of 1994 to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the information necessary to fulfill his requirements as established in title 10, United States Code. This comprehensive system provides uniform policy and procedures for reporting the ability of the Armed Forces of the United States to fight and to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy.

Title 10, United States Code (USC), [update with current law] directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans (section 153(a)(3)(c)). The statute further requires the Chairman to establish, after consultation with the CINCs, a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out assigned missions (section 153(a)(3)(D)), and a uniform system for reporting on the readiness of the CSAs to perform with respect to a war or threat to national security (section 193(c)).

The Chairman's Readiness System applies to the Joint Staff, Services, combat commands, and DOD Combat Support Agencies. These agencies include DIA, DISA, DLA, NIMA, and NSA.

The Chairman's Readiness System is designed to assess both unit and joint readiness.

Unit readiness is assessed by unit commanders and reported through the Services. Joint readiness is assessed and reported by the CINCs. Each level of readiness has unique metrics. Unit readiness metrics focus on people, training, and equipment. Joint readiness is assessed against key functional areas that enable CINCs to integrate and synchronize forces. The readiness assessments are, by nature, subjective -- the metrics do not define readiness by themselves. They are tools used by those responsible for readiess -- unit commanders and CINCs.

The Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)

The JMRR is the central component of the Chairman's Readiness System.

The JMRR provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a **current** and **broad** assessment of the military's readiness to fight, across all three levels of war. Representatives from the Services and the Joint Staff Director of Operations provide this assessment to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Operations Deputies, and CSAs. JMRR instructions are contained in CJCSI 3401.01B.

The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle:

The "Full JMRR," conducted quarterly, provides a snapshot of current readiness.

- The "Full JMRR" is conducted quarterly or as requested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Services present an assessment of unit readiness. CINCs and CSAs submit an assessment of joint readiness. The Joint Staff Director of Operations (J-3) presents the combined readiness assessments of the CINCs and agency directors.

The "By-Exception JMRR" is the least extensive review.

- The "By-Exception JMRR" is conducted during months in which no Full JMRR is scheduled. Services, CINCs, and CSAs report to J-3 any significant changes since the last Full JMRR. A briefing will only be scheduled if the changes signal a major warfighting impact.

The quarterly "Feedback JMRR" provides a forum to discuss proposed actions to address specific current readiness deficiencies.

- The "Feedback JMRR" is conducted quarterly, in conjunction with a "By-Exception JMRR." It provides a forum to review status of actions being taken to address specific current readiness deficiencies raised in previous assessments. It is a collaborative effort between the Services, CINCs, CSAs, and the Joint Staff.

JMRR RESPONSIBILITIES:

***Chair**: VCJCS*

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairs the JMRR.

***The Joint Staff**:*
The Joint Staff is the JMRR focal point.

The Joint Staff Director of Operations (J-3) is the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the JMRR process. The J-3 provides the joint readiness portion of the Full JMRR.

Each Joint Staff director attends the JMRR. The Joint Staff directorates designated as OPRs' in Table 1 below have the following responsibilities.

- Receive readiness reports from the CINCs and CSAs.
- Prepare functional area assessments for presentation at the JMRR.
- Track deficiency resolution status for the Feedback JMRR. During the Feedback JMRR, the appropriate Joint Staff director briefs actions taken on readiness deficiencies.

Table 1. Functional Areas and Joint Staff Office of Primary Responsibility

FUNCTIONAL AREAS	*OPR*
Joint Personnel	**J-1**
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance	**J-2**
Special Operations	**J-3**
Mobility	**J-4**
Logistics/Sustainment	**J-4**
Infrastructure	**J-4**
Command/Control/Communications/Computers	**J-6**
Joint War Planning and Training	**J-7**

Services *assess unit readiness.*

The Service Operations Deputies, as the senior Service representatives to the JMRR, present unit readiness assessments for their respective Service.

Commanders in Chief of Combat Commands (CINCs) *assess joint readiness.*

CINCs submit readiness assessments in functional areas that enable them to integrate and synchronize forces to execute their assigned missions. Because of unique title 10, USC responsibilities, a USSOCOM representative preents special operations unit readiness in the same format as the Service unit readiness presentations.

Combat Support Agencies provide broader perspective.

The CSAs submit assessments in the same functional areas as the CINCs. In addition, CSA directors provide a narrative overall assessment of the agency's ability to support the CINCs. This assessment is used to fulfill the Chairman's reporting requirements, referenced in title 10, USC section 193, which states the CJCS must implement and maintain a uniform system to report on the readiness of the CSAs to help fight a war or a threat to national security.

OSD, DUSD(R) attends.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness (DUSD(R)) is the senior OSD JMRR representative.

FULL JMRR FORMAT: SERVICE DATA

Service Unit Readiness Report. *Service Operations Deputies report current real-world force commitments and force assignments to a notional warfighting scenario. Data includes current unit location, current and projected unit readiness, support force capability and readiness, and major Service readiness trends.*

In this report, Services provide the current and projected readiness of major combat and support forces. Specific requirements are outlined in the JMRR scenario guidance message. Descriptions of the areas required to be addressed in reporting unit readiness are as follows:

- **Current Unit Location by Geographic CINC.** Services depict the current location of significant combat and support units by geographic CINC to illustrate current force commitment or deployments.
- **Current and Projected Unit Readiness.** Services depict current and projected (6 and 12 months) readiness of major combat and support units by overall C-level status, using standard GSORTS definitions.
- **Readiness in Relation to Warfighting Scenario.** Services depict the readiness of major combat and support units that would be tasked to support a warfighting scenario. This feeds the CINCs assessment of the ability to conduct current and + 12-month operations. It provides the Chairman a flexible method of assessing major theater war (MTW) scenario requirements as outlined in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Operational Plans (OPLANS).
- **Support Force Capability Readiness**. Services depict current, projected, and scenario assessments of their support force capability in six major areas: theater mobility support, engineers, health services, sustainability, security, and field services. Assessments are accomplished using a C-1 to C-4 scale similar to GSORTS.

- **Major Service Readiness Trends.** Services depict current and projected major readiness trends in the areas of personnel, equipment, training, and enablers as shown in Table 2. The assessment is depicted using "stoplights" and trend arrows. Services add specific comments to amplify each individual trend area.
- **Detailed Readiness Trends.** Services present specific trend indicators that provide greater insight into personnel, equipment, and training trends over the past 2 years, and project forward for the next year.
- **Tempo Reporting.** Services provide an executive level summary of current tempo and its associated impact on readiness.

Table 2. Service Readiness Trend Example Metrics

AREA	*METRIC EXAMPLES*
Personnel	Retention, recruiting, skill level shortfalls, PERSTEMPO, DEPTEMPO, OPTEMPO
Equipment	Maintenance backlogs, spare parts availability critical equipment shortages, maintenance problems
Training	Training opportunity lost, impact of unscheduled deployments, training resource shortfalls
Enablers	Low-density critical unit or capability status

Chapter Two

FULL JMRR FORMAT: CINC AND AGENCY DATA

***Joint Readiness Report**. CINCs and Combat Support Agencies assess the eight joint readiness functional areas listed in Table 1.*

CINCs and CSAs assess their capability in the relevant functional areas that enable the integration and synchronization of forces, using a C-1 to C-4 scale similar to GSORTS. Additional requirements may be derived from JSCP tasking, JCS-directed tasking, or CINC-directed tasking. CINCs and CSAs submit a current assessment and a 12-month projection.

Additionally, CINCs and CSAs assess each functional area in relation to the warfighting scenario using the same C-level definitions. A summary of CINC and CSA assessment criteria is shown in Tables 3 and 4.

Mobility and Pre-Positioned Equipment Supports Joint Readiness

Table 3. CINC/Agency Assessment of Current and Projected Joint Readiness

CURRENT AND PROJECTED READINESS	***CINC*** ***USJFCOM*** ***USCINCEUR*** ***USSOUTHCOM*** ***USPACOM*** ***USCENTCOM*** ***CFC***	***CINC*** ***USTRANSCOM*** ***USSOCOM*** ***USSPACECOM*** ***AGENCIES*** ***DIA DLA*** ***DISA NSA*** ***NIMA DTRA***	***CINC*** ***USSTRATCOM*** ***NORAD***
Current	Assess readiness and capability of functional area to meet current theater requirements.	Assess readiness and capability of functional area to support current worldwide requirements.	USSTRATCOM assess readiness and capability of functional area to meet its current OPLAN requirements. NORAD assesses readiness and capability of functional area to meet current mission requirements.
+12 Month	Assess readiness and capability of functional area to meet expected theater requirements over the next 12 months.	Assess readiness and capability of functional area to meet expected worldwide requirements over the next 12 months.	Assess readiness and capability of functional area to meet its expected OPLAN and mission requirements over the next 12 months.

Table 4 CINC/Agency Assessment of MTW Scenario

WARFIGHTING SCENARIO	SUPPORTED CINC	SUPPORTING CINC/AGENCY
1st MTW	Assess readiness and capability of functional area to meet MTW requirements as identified in current approved OPLAN given JSCP force tables and JMRR scenario guidance message.	Assess readiness and capability to meet support requirements for 1st MTW. Assess impact on conduct of other assigned missions.
2d MTW	Assess readiness and capability of functional area to meet requirements as identified in current approved OPLAN given 1st MTW has been executed.	Assess readiness and capability to support 1st and 2d MTW.

Chapter Two

RESULTS OF THE FULL JMRR

The JMRR provides a current readiness assessment at the strategic level.

In addition to assessing the Armed Forces' current readiness to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy, the JMRR provides a list of CINC, Service, and CSA current readiness and capability deficiencies that are aggregated into Key Risk Elements and Strategic Concerns. These resulting concerns are used to make an overall risk assessment at the strategic level. The Vice Chairman reports this information quarterly to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.

Example Strategic Concern Formulation



Chapter Two

Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) & Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC)

The Senior Readiness Oversight Council is an executive committee of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

SROC membership includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, the Under Secretaries of Defense and of the Military Departments, and other senior OSD officials with interest in readiness. The SROC brings the senior civilian and military leadership together in monthly meetings to review significant readiness topics.

Once per quarter, the Service Chiefs provide a summary of current and projected readiness concerns, similar in scope and form to that provided in the JMRR. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides a joint readiness assessment. Additionally, the Vice Chairman presents an overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy.

Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress. Required within 45 days following the end of each calendar quarter.

The DOD Authorization Act, 1996, requires within 30 days following the end of each calendar year quarter a report to Congress based on readiness assessments provided to a DOD forum (SROC) with responsibility for readiness oversight. The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is approved by the secretary of Defense (SecDef) prior to forwarding to Congress.

Chapter Two

Ready to Fight and Win

Chapter Three

Addressing Readiness Concerns

Current Readiness

Current readiness deficiencies are analyzed during the month following the Full JMRR.

Results of Joint, Service, and CSA actions to address readiness deficiencies are presented to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Deputies at the Feedback JMRR session.

Addressing readiness deficiencies requires close coordination among the Joint, Service, CINC, and agency staffs.

Feedback JMRR. The Joint Staff directorates lead the deficiency analysis effort for their respective functional areas. This effort requires close coordination among the Joint, Service, CINC, and CSA staffs. In conducting this analysis:

- The deficiencies may be addressed by any combination of operational, policy, or fiscal actions. Some deficiencies may be recommended for no action due to the cost, benefit, and risk analysis. Remedies should focus on near-term operational workarounds as well as long-term programmatic solutions.
- Deficiencies that require programmatic action may be recommended for consideration by one of the JWCA teams.

A deficiency can be resolved in one of two ways -- either accept the risk or take action to correct the deficiency.

- The eventual outcome of each deficiency analysis will be to either accept the risk or take appropriate action. The status of ongoing work and final resolution will be tracked in the JMRR Deficiency Database (DDB) and reported in the Feedback JMRR. Deficiencies may be closed through staff coordination and DJS approval or through semiannual CINC revalidation of the DDB.
- The analysis of the staff actions to address readiness deficiencies are presented to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who can refocus staff efforts, if required.

Current Readiness Deficiency Cycle



Chapter Three

Future Readiness

Future readiness concerns are addressed by the military capability assessments conducted through the JWCA process.

The JMRR process focuses on current readiness to fight, but there is a continuity between current readiness -- out to 2 years -- and future military capability. The Joint Staff analyzes future capability requirements through the JWCA.

Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment. Just as the JMRR fills the need for recurring analysis of current readiness and near-term readiness projection, the JWCA, under the purview of the expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), includes a systematic analysis of the capabilities and requirements of future forces.

The JWCA is composed of 14 long-term assessment areas conducted by the Joint Staff. The 14 areas studied are depicted in the chart below.

The JWCA Domain [Update]



The JROC performs mission needs review and validation and prioritization of requirements.

JROC. The JROC, with membership of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chief of each Service, performs mission needs review, validates and prioritizes requirements, and makes recommendations on the best placement of our scarce dollars and resources. Arising from the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, the JROC is designed to provide a senior military perspective on what the Nation requires for national defense, and, in particular, to judge whether various major weapons, weapon systems, and other military capabilities are required.

". . . I'd like to talk to you about the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments or JWCAs, as they are called. This is a program that gets a lot of joint leverage. These JWCA teams . . . [are] composed of people from the Joint Staff, from each of the services, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who bring expertise to that particular area . . . the JROC has tried to seek a balance among . . . the right force structure in order to do the National Military Strategy . . . enough funds for readiness, modernization, . . . an important aspect of future readiness, and . . . infrastructure . . ."

General Joseph W. Ralston
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Before the House National Security Committee

27 March 1996

The result of the JWCA analyses and their review by the JROC is input to the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).

Product of the JWCA/JROC. The result of the JWCA analyses and their review by the JROC is input to the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR). Through the CPR, the Chairman provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for inclusion in the annual Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG provides programming guidance to the Services. Through the CPA, the Chairman provides an assessment of Service programs to the Secretary of Defense. This assessment helps ensure Service programs adequately address joint warfighting requirements.

To ensure CINCs are informed of JWCA actions and recommendations, the JROC members visit each CINC during the biannual process.



The biannual CINC visits update the CINCs in JWCA analyses and provide CINC feedback to JROC members.

The purpose of the visit to the CINCs is to provide information on the JWCA assessments and ensures JROC members understand CINC concerns. The chart above demonstrates the interrelationship of the JWCAs, the JROC review, the Services' POM development process, the visits to the CINCs, and publication of the CPR and CPA.

JMRR/JWCA Interaction

The JMRR and JWCA work together to solve deficiencies identified by CINCs, Services, and CSAs.

Because deficiencies identified in the Joint Monthly Readiness Review may require long-term, programmatic fixes, the JMRR process will feed such deficiencies to the applicable JWCA assessment team for appropriate action, such as cost tradeoff analysis.

JMRR / JWCA Interaction [Update]



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Chapter Four

Keeping the Force "Ready to Fight and Win"

Future military capability depends upon investments in people, force enhancements, modernization, and infrastructure.

Adequate investment in long-term military capability is necessary to ensure the best people are recruited, trained and retained, preserve the technological edge, replace worn out equipment, and obtain the capabilities required to make the Armed Forces more effective. At the same time, base facilities and housing must be maintained because both are critical to long-term capability.

Unchanging Concerns



Chapter Four

READINESS PRIORITIES

Quality people are most important to the future readiness of the Armed Forces.

People. The superb men and women in uniform today serve as our nation's credentials. To maintain this outstanding force, we must continue to invest in the key programs that benefit our Service members: effective education and training, fair and adequate compensation, steady and dependable medical benefits, quality family housing, and a stable retirement system.

People are the Foundation of Readiness

Chapter Four

A critical element of future military capability is funding for recapitalization, modernization and force enhancements.

Enhancing Force Capabilities. The readiness of tomorrow's force will depend on more strategic lift; more long-range precision and smart munitions; more pre-positioned sets in selected forward locations; improved and expanded command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence.

Critical Force Enhancements strengthen our Military Capability

The combination of improved deployability, lethality, and capability will ensure the US Armed Forces are ready to meet future challenges.

Chapter Four

Future readiness depends on sustaining a satisfactory level of major equipment and facility maintenance.

Infrastructure. Military installations are key enablers for power projection. If facilities deteriorate, repair costs increase. This deterioration increases the risk of unacceptable mission interruption and jeopardizes future capability.

Infrastructure

Readiness is and must remain the top priority of the Department of Defense. Current readiness is assessed and maintained by the Chairman's Readiness System.

In the long term, the continued readiness of our forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy will depend on a strong commitment to recruit, train, and retain the best people, enhance force capabilities, and maintain facilities. By aggressively monitoring current readiness and ensuring the readiness priorities receive attention, we can avoid the mistakes of the past and keep our force ready to meet tomorrow's challenges.

Appendix A

Glossary

All terms listed below are extracted from Joint Publication 1-02 and are included here for ease of reference. Terms associated with the JMRR, but not standardized within the Department of Defense, are shown at Appendix B, JMRR Lexicon.

C-day. The day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.)

combat readiness. Synonymous with operational readiness, with respect to missions or functions performed in combat.

combat ready. Synonymous with operationally ready, with respect to missions or functions performed in combat.

D-day. The day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

F-day. Used for deliberate planning, day on which flexible deterrent option (FDO) or FDO and force enhancement (FE) force deployment begins.

F-hour. Effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

I-day. Declared by the NCA, associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (ambiguous intelligence warning).

M-day. The term used to designate the day on which full mobilization commences or is to commence.

military capability. The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.

a. force structure. Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, airwings.

b. modernization. Technical sophistication of forces, units weapon systems, and equipment.

c. unit readiness. The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.

d. Sustainability. The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. See also readiness.

military objectives. The derived set of military actions to be taken to implement NCA guidance in support of national objectives. Defines the results to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to commanders. See also national objectives.

military requirement. An established need justifying the timely allocation of resources to achieve a capability to accomplish approved military objectives, missions, or tasks. Also called operational requirement. See also objective force level.

military resources. Military and civilian personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies under control of a DOD component.

N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

national objectives. The aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. See also military objectives.

objective force level. The level of military forces that needs to be attained within a finite time frame and resource level to accomplish approved military objectives, missions, or tasks. See also military requirement.

operationally ready. 1. As applied to a unit, ship, or weapon system -- capable of performing the missions or functions for which organized or designed. Incorporates both equipment readiness and personnel readiness. 2. As applied to personnel -- available and qualified to perform assigned missions or functions.

operational readiness. The capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. May be used in a general sense or to express a level or degree of readiness. See also combat readiness.

Operational Readiness Evaluation. An evaluation of the operational capability and effectiveness of a unit or any portion thereof.

Operational Requirement. See military requirement.

readiness. The ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy (NMS). Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels:

a. unit readiness: The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.

b. joint readiness. The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions. (See also military capability.

readiness condition. See operational readiness.

readiness planning. Operational planning required for peacetime operations. Its objective is the maintenance of high states of readiness and the deterrence of potential enemies. It includes planning activities that influence day-to-day operations and the peacetime posture of forces. As such, its focus is on general capabilities and readiness rather than the specifics of a particular crisis, either actual or potential. The assignment of geographic responsibilities to combatant commanders, establishment of readiness standards and levels, development of peacetime deployment patterns, coordination of reconnaissance and surveillance assets and capabilities, and planning of joint exercises are examples of readiness planning. No formal joint planning system exists for readiness planning as exists for contingency and execution planning.

W-day. Declared by the NCA, associated with an adversary's decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

Appendix B

Lexicon

The following terms and definitions have been adapted for use with the JMRR and may not be standardized within the Department of Defense. The vocabulary serves as a common language and reference among the Services, CINCs, CSAs, and JS as it pertains to the JMRR.

capability deficiency. Identified as a lack of resources to meet established mission requirements. Deficiency concerns resources that do not exist within the Department of Defense (e.g., total airlift required exceeds total airlift available).

Category I Deficiency. JMRR deficiency that is a critical warfighting risk driver for OPLANS and/or CONPLANS.

Category II Deficiency. Deficiencies in the JMRR DDB that contribute lesser risk to the NMS.

course of action. Term associated with the Feedback JMRR. A viable remedy to address a readiness deficiency.

current. A time reference used in assessing both unit and joint readiness. It is intended to represent the present time. Joint Staff J-3 establishes the current in the JMRR guidance message as a baseline to assess the readiness and capability of a functional area to support current requirements applicable to the command or agency.

deficiency. Term associated with the Feedback JMRR. CINC and CSA-reported reduction in readiness or lack of capability that adversely affects a CINC's or CSA's ability to execute assigned missions by causing a functional area rating of C-3 or C-4.

enabler. Term associated with the JMRR. This is a critical unit or capability essential to support joint operations.

engineers. Term associated with Service assessment of support enablers. Includes the following components for assessment purposes: military, specialized or contingency construction; real estate acquisition; contract construction; key specialized functions.

field services. Term associated with Service assessment of support force capability or unit readiness. Field services consist of the following components for assessment purposes: water production and distribution, laundry, bath, shelter, and mortuary services.

health services. Term associated with Service assessment of support force capability of unit readiness. Health services is described as all medically related functions performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include patient C2, forward deployable hospitals, patient evacuation, medical supply, and force protection.

impact. Term associated with the Feedback JMRR. Specific effect of deficiency on CINC and CSA ability to execute assigned mission(s). This is usually expressed in relation to mission(s); e.g., second phase of operation will be delayed 10 days.

infrastructure. A joint readiness functional area. Infrastructure consists of permanent and temporary facilities that support sustainment, transportation, and military operations. It includes, for purposes of assessment, installations, ranges, beddown for personnel and equipment, road and rail networks, airfields, seaports, POL and water distribution, and power generation.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). A joint readiness functional area. ISR is described by the following components for assessment purposes: IMINT, SIGINT, ELINT, HUMINT, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) systems capabilities; intelligence personnel and training; interoperability of intelligence systems and personnel; mobility of intelligence systems and assets; vulnerability of intelligence systems and assets; geospatial information and services; and the collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence information.

joint personnel. A joint readiness functional area. Joint personnel consists of the following components for assessment purposes: joint headquarters manning levels, joint personnel systems capability, augmentation capability, headquarters deployability, Reserve Component availability, and component personnel fill.

joint war planning and training. A joint readiness functional area. Joint war planning and training consists of the following components for assessment purposes: Joint training and exercises, joint and joint task force (JTF) headquarters organization, joint doctrine, joint deliberate planning, joint force commander's assessment.

key risk element. An aggregation of JMRR-reported Cat I readiness deficiencies that is used to formulate strategic concerns. Such a grouping may also facilitate resource prioritization for deficiency resolution.

Logistics and sustainment. A joint readiness functional area. Logistics and sustainment consists of the following components for assessment purposes: pre-positioned assets afloat and ashore, munitions, health service support, equipment that facilitates movement (e.g., military handling equipment (MHE) and cargo handling equipment (CHE)), equipment maintenance capability, and other classes of supply (I, II, III, IV, VII, IX).

mobility. A joint readiness functional area. Mobility as a functional area is described by the following components for assessment purposes: strategic airlift, strategic sealift, spacelift, special operations movement, intratheater mobility, and throughput.

planner JMRR. A dry-run presentation of the JMRR, normally conducted a week prior. Serves as a coordinating mechanism -- avoids the need for paper coordination of the JMRR product.

plus 12 Months. Assessment of readiness and capability of functional areas to meet expected requirements over the next 12 months. In making that assessment, any changes over the 12-month period should be noted.

Readiness Deficiency. Identified as a readiness degradation because of the condition of an existing Department of Defense resource or the inability of an existing capability to fully perform its function (e.g., training deficiencies, broken C-141s).

security. Term associated with Service assessment of support force capability of unit readiness. Security is described by the following components: combat support and specialized military police, airfield protection, and inshore undersea warfare and port security.

solution. Term associated with the Feedback JMRR. A Service-, CINC-, or CSA-accepted and planned corrective action to remedy a deficiency.

special operations. A joint readiness functional area. Special operations are described by the following components for assessment purposes: direct action, unconventional warfare; PSYOP; civil affairs; foreign internal defense; counterterrorism; and special operations-unique intelligence, logistics, training, and equipment.

strategic concern. An aggregation of key risk elements that impact readiness to execute the NMS. The strategic concerns form the basis of the risk assessment reported to the SROC.

sustainability. Term associated with Service assessment of support force capability of unit readiness. Sustainability is described by the following components for assessment purposes: pre-positioned unit and bare base sets, spares and stocks, ammunition, bulk POL distribution, weapon system reliability and maintainability, general support theater maintenance, intermediate maintenance afloat or ashore, depot capability and backlog, and contingency contracting.

theater mobility support. Term associated with Service assessment of support force capability of unit readiness. Theater mobility support is described by the following components for assessment purposes: transition ashore, air mobility ground interface, and intratheater distribution.

workaround. Term associated with the Feedback JMRR. Temporary (near-term) measures employed to remedy or lessen the adverse impact of a deficiency.

Appendix C

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AOR	area of responsibility
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CAT	category
CFC	Combined Forces Command (Korea)
CHE	container handling equipment
CINC	commander in chief of a combatant command
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CSA	Combat Support Agency
DAA	Defense Authorization Act
DDB	deficiency database
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DJS	Director Joint Staff
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DUSD(R)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness
ELINT	electronic intelligence
FY	fiscal year
GIS	Geospatial Information Systems
GSORTS	Global Resources and Training System
HUMINT	human intelligence
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IPL	integrated priority list
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-Directorates	Directors of the Joint Staff Directorates
JLOTS	joint logistics over the shore

Appendix C

JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JMRR	Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JROCM	Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum
JS	Joint Staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF	joint task force
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MHE	materiel handling equipment
MTW	major theater war
NCA	National Command Authorities
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NMS	National Military Strategy
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSA	National Security Agency
OpsDep	operations deputies
OPLAN	operational plan
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OPTEMPO	operations tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PERSTEMPO	personnel tempo
POC	point of contact
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POM	programmed objective memorandum
Prepo	pre-position
PSYOP	psychological operations
QRRC	Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SDR	Semiannual Deficiency Review
SOF	special operations forces
SOOP	special operations, operations plans, and policy
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System

SROC	Senior Readiness Oversight Council
SSC	small-scale contingency
USC	US Code
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, US European Command
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USJFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
USPACOM	US Pacific Command
USSPACECOM	US Space Command
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
USSTRATCOM	US Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
VTC	video teleconference

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Appendix D

References

1. Title 10, United States Code, Section 153

2. Title 10, United States Code, Section 193

3. Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”

4. Joint Publication 1-03.3, “Joint Reporting Structure”

5. CJCSI 3401.01, “Current Readiness System”

6. CJCSI 3110.01, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan”

7. CJSM 3500.04, “Universal Joint Task List”

Appendix C

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JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF